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- 信念知识和实践问题(英文版)
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- 作者：高洁|责编:周烨楠
- 出版社：浙江大学
- ISBN：9787308246798
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售价：35.2
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内容大纲
本书聚焦于当代分析哲学知识论领域的前沿论题实践侵入知识论（pragmatic encroachment），对知识、信念认识态度与实践之间的关系提出了一系列原创观点。实践侵入知识论主张知识等认识态度与实践因素之间具有紧密联系，主要诉诸知识与行动之间的一系列直观的联系，包括支持知识是理性行动的认识规范的直觉判断和知识归赋对实践因素的敏感性。本书通过辨析信念与实践因素之间的关联对以上知识与行动之间的关联进行了解释，辩护了可错论的温和不变主义。
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作者介绍
高洁，爱丁堡大学哲学博士，现为浙江大学哲学学院研究员， Asian Journal of Philosophy（《亚洲哲学杂志》）副主编，约翰内斯堡大学高级研究员。主要研究方向为知识论，也涉及心智哲学、决策论、认知哲学和语言学中相关内容。
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目录
Introduction
PART Ⅰ Pars Destruens
1.Knowledge and Practical Matters
1.1 Practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions
1.2 The knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
l.3 Pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
1.4 Problems for pragmatic encroachment
1.5 Moderate invariantist accounts ofthe practical factor eicects on knowledge ascriptions
1.6 Criticisms to the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
1.7 Concluding remarks
2.Hilgh Stakes and Iterated-knowledge
2.1 The iterated knowledge account ofhigh-stakes cases
2.2 Counterintuitive appropriateness
2.3 Higher-order reasoning/knowledge and practical rationality
2.4 Non-luminosity,higher-order belief and blameworthiness
2.5 Concluding remarks
3 Rational Action Without Knowledge(and Vice Versa)
3.1 The epistemic norlTls ofpractical reasoning
3.2 Counterexample one：rational action based on acceptance
3.3 Counterexample two：rational action performed by the sceptic
3.4 The excuse manoeuvre
3.5 Concluding remarks
4.Doxastic Accounts
4.1 Weatherson’s doxastic pragmatism
4.2 Ganson’S doxastic pragmatism
4.3 Objections to Weatherson and Ganson’s accounts
4.4 Bach’s doxastic pragmatism m
4.5 Nagel’s psychological account
4.6 Objections to Bach and Nagel’s accounts
4.7 Concluding remarks
PART Ⅱ Pars Construens
5.Credal Pragmatism
5.1 Two types ofpractical factors
5.2 Threshold pragmatism and credal pragmatism
5.3 Credal pragmatism Vs.threshold pragmatism
5.4 Objections and replies
5.5 Three dimensions ofepistemic rationality
5.6 Concluding remarks
6.Credal Pragmatism and the Distinction Between Dispositional Beliefand
Oecurrent Belief
6.1 Dispositional belief and occurrent belief
6.2 Dispositional belief,occurrent belief and practical factor effects
6.3 Diagnoses ofhigh-stakes cases
6.4 Concluding remarks
7.Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm ofPractical Reasoning
7.1 Fallibilism and the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
7.2 Threshold makers and communicative heuristic accounts
7.3 The infallibilist intuition and the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
7.4 Concluding remarks
Concluding Remarks
Bibliography
Index
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